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Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute
Forty Years Later
I. Introduction
The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan involves a
struggle between two powers for the possession of a tract of territory
which each wants for its own valid reasons. The stakes are of major
economic, political and strategic significance to Pakistan, while to
India, Kashmir has become a symbol of national prestige and inter-
national justice.1 Charges of aggression and violations of interna-
tional law have been asserted by both parties. In considering a solu-
tion to the Kashmir dispute, it is necessary to look beyond the
blatant facts and see the elements that gave rise to the dispute and
the circumstances under which it occurred.
A purely legalistic approach never solves large political
problems. With this in mind, this Comment begins with an examina-
tion of the roots of the conflict: Kashmir's economy, geography,
predominantly Moslem population and Hindu ruler. It will then look
at the dispute over Kashmir's accession to India and obligations re-
sulting from United Nations involvement in the dispute. This Com-
ment will focus on the important role the policies and practices of
India and Pakistan have played in the development of events, and
the part these elements must play in arriving at a solution.
II. The Roots of Conflict
On August 15, 1947, British India was partitioned under the
Indian Independence Act, creating the Dominions of India and Paki-
stan.2 The partition of India into independent India and Pakistan
was an extremely complicated process for which the British made
absolutely no preparation.8 Before the summer of 1947, no real
thought had been given to the division of Indian financial assets, the
Indian army, diplomatic missions abroad, communications, the water
supply to irrigation projects and a thousand other problems that
1. Alam, Peacekeeping Without Conflict Resolution: The Kashmir Dispute, 6
FLETCHER F. 61, 62 (1982) [hereinafter Alam].
2. H.S. GURURAi RAO, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE KASHMIR PROBLEM 156 (1967) [herein-
after H.S. GURURAJ RAO].
3. A LAMB, THE KASHMIR PROBLEM, A HISTORY SURVEY 11 (1966) (hereinafter A.
LAMB].
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would arise upon partition."
In one sense, the Kashmir dispute can be seen as a consequence
of Britain's failure to find a satisfactory means of integrating the
princely states into independent India and Pakistan.5 The Indian In-
dependence Act merely provided that the princely states could ac-
cede to either India or Pakistan or consider some other arrange-
ment.' At the time of partition, Kashmir was one of three princely
states that had not determined its future status.7
A. A Brief Survey of Kashmir's Population, Economy and
Geography
Before 1947, the state of Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) was a
region with an 80% Moslem majority contiguous with the Moslem
majority region of the Punjab which became part of Pakistan.,
Kashmir is not a homogeneous unit, but actually consists of five re-
gions: the "Vale" of Kashmir was 90% Moslem, the Jammu prov-
ince contained a 59% Hindu majority, the Poonch province con-
tained a Moslem majority of over 90%, and the Gilgit region in the
northwest is predominantly Moslem.9 Finally, the Ladakh and Bal-
tistan region, treated as a single district, is split, Ladakh possessing
an overwhelmingly Buddhist population, while Baltistan is over-
whelmingly Moslem."0
In 1947, the economy of Kashmir was closely linked with Paki-
stan.11 Its best communications with the outside world lay through
Pakistan by way of the Indus River and the road from Srinagar, the
Maharaja's summer capital, to Rawalpindi in Pakistan.12 In addi-
tion, these were the routes used for the bulk of Kashmir's exports.'3
Finally, the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab, all of
which flow through Kashmir territory, were vital to the agricultural
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3. When Britain relinquished control, there were 562 princely states of various
sizes in British India, covering about one-third of the total area of the Indian Empire. The
princely states came into being as a result of the concept of paramountcy whereby some In-
dian rulers were allowed to survive as sovereignties in treaty relationship with the British
Crown. These rulers in turn surrendered to the Crown the right to conduct their own foreign
policy, but retained a great deal of independence in other areas. In matters of internal policy,
the rulers could do as they pleased, provided they did not threaten the stability of British rule
in the subcontinent or commit acts of oppression so obvious as to offend the British-Indian
Government. In addition, the British made no attempt to ensure that the rulers of the states
belonged to the same religious community as did the majority of their subjects. Id. at 4.
6. H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 21 (citing the Indian Independence Act, §§
2(4), &(1)).
7. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 15. The other regions were Junagadh and Hyderabad. Id.
8. Id. at 22.
9. Id. at 18-20.
10. Id. at 19.
11. Id. at 22.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 22.
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life of Pakistan.' Based on the culture and economy of the region, a
well-planned partition would have awarded the greater part of Kash-
mir to Pakistan. However, Kashmir, with its overwhelming majority
of Moslem, was controlled by a Hindu ruler of the dynasty known as
the Dogra Rajputs.15
B. Accession and Conflict
As previously mentioned, at the time of partition, Kashmir had
not determined its future status. The Maharaja could not decide
whether to accede to India or Pakistan or to remain independent. 6
In August of 1947, the Maharaja entered into a Standstill Agree-
ment with Pakistan.' 7 This agreement transferred responsibility for
administering certain services in Jammu and Kashmir such as the
post, telegraph and railways from India to Pakistan.' 8
However, with revolt in the Poonch province, the Maharaja soon
changed his mind.' 9 Poonch had been an important recruiting area
for the British army during World War 11. ° As a result, ex-service-
men in this area provided a cadre of military experience which, in
August of 1947, became the nucleus for the Azad (Free) Kashmir
liberation movement." While India accused Pakistan of supplying
the movement with weapons and troops, it appears that the Poonch
rebels were in contact with the Pathan tribal country in Pakistan
where they sought arms produced in village workshops. 22
Initially, the Poonch rising appears to have been nothing more
than an attempt to throw off the rule of the Maharaja after parti-
tion, but its character soon changed.23 By September, the Moslem-
Sikh conflict which had been raging in the Punjab overflowed into
Kashmir.24 In Jammu, Hindu and Sikh bands crossing over from the
Punjab touched off a series of massacres which killed over 200,000
Moslems.2 The Pathan tribesmen in contact with the Azad Kashmir
14. Id.
15. Id. at 23-26. Gulab Singh, creator of the modern state of Jammu and Kashmir, was
a member of the Dogra family, claiming Rajput ancestry. By 1840, Gulab Singh, the Raja of
Jammu, had gained control over Poonch, Ladakh, and Baltistan. In 1846, with the defeat of
the Sikh Kingdom of Lahore by the British, Gulab Singh accepted British paramountcy and
purchased the Vale of Kashmir for 7,500,000 rupees. Gulab Singh and his successors were
only partly successful in bringing the Gilgit region under control. By the 1890's, it was the
British Agent at Gilgit who wielded the real authority here. It was in this way that a group of
otherwise unrelated tracts of land became the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Id.
16. Alam, supra note 1, at 62.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 36.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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movement, hearing of these events, invaded Kashmir on October
22.6 Pakistan blames India for the massacres, while India blames
Pakistan for the tribal invasion." However, it is argued that the
massacres occurred without influence from the Indian government
and provoked the Pathan tribal invasion."
It was in the context of this invasion that the Maharaja decided
to execute the Instrument of Accession to India.19 After acceptance
by the Governor-general of India on October 27, 1947, Indian troops
entered Kashmir and pushed the tribesmen back, but were unable to
expel them from the border areas.80
1. Kashmir and the United Nations.3 1-Following the failure
of the two governments to settle the Kashmir conflict by direct nego-
tiations, the Indian government, through its representative to the
United Nations (U.N.), brought the situation to the attention of the
Security Council on January 1, 1948, under Articles 34 and 35 of
the U.N. Charter. 2 India accused Pakistan of giving assistance to
the invading forces, "including, but not limited to, the supply of
arms and ammunition." 3 Pakistan, instead of answering the specific
charges of aggression, filed countercharges against the government
of India under Article 35, charging it with the breach of interna-
tional agreements, incitement of revolution, "numerous attacks on
Pakistan territory," and an "extensive campaign of genocide. . . the
object [of which] is the destruction of the state of Pakistan."'
In response to the situation, the Security Council established the
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP).3 5
UNCIP had a dual function: to investigate the facts pursuant to Ar-
ticle 34 of the U.N. Charter, and to exercise any mediatory influence
likely to smooth away difficulties and carry out the directions of the
Council.36 On April 21, after three months of further consideration,
26. Alam, supra note 1, at 62.
27. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 38.
28. Id.
29. S.P. SHUKLA, INDIA AND PAKISTAN, THE ORIGINS OF ARMED CONFLICT 4 (1984)
[hereinafter S.P. SHUKLA].
30. Alam, supra note 1, at 62.
31. India became a member of the U.N. on October 30, 1945, while Pakistan joined the
U.N. on September 30, 1947. U.N. DEP'T OF PUn. INFO., EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS, at 8-
9, U.N. Sales No. E.79.I.5 (9th ed. 1979) [hereinafter EVERYONE'S UNITED NATIONS].
32. U.N. CHARTER art. 34: "The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any
situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to deter-
mine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance
of international peace and security." Id.
Art. 35, para. 1: "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any
situation referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council . Id.
33. Alam, supra note 1, at 63.
34. Id.




the Security Council adopted a second resolution advising that both
Indian troops and the tribesmen should withdraw; that an interim
government should be established to represent "the major [Kash-
miri] political groups" (meaning both the Indian-influenced National
Conference of Kashmir and the Pakistani-influenced Azad Kashmir
elements); and that a five-man UNCIP should go to Kashmir to ex-
ercise its good offices in helping the two nations restore peace and
arrange a fair plebiscite.37 While the resolution essentially agreed
with an earlier Pakistani call for troop withdrawals and a plebiscite,
which India rejected, Pakistan felt that an impartial plebiscite would
be impossible under the National Conference of Kashmir (National
Conference).3 The resolution was rejected by both parties.39
When UNCIP arrived in Pakistan on July 7, 1948, it discovered
that the situation had changed drastically. ° Pakistani Foreign Min-
ister Zafrullah Khan admitted that Pakistani troops had been fight-
ing in Kashmir since May 8.41 Discovering this, UNCIP shifted its
efforts to effect a cease-fire followed by a truce agreement providing
for demilitarization. 42 This would permit a free and impartial plebi-
scite to be held throughout Kashmir." The results of the Commis-
sion's efforts were agreements which were embodied in the Commis-
sion's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and were
accepted by both parties." These were implemented in two ways:
First, by the cessation of hostilities effected January 1, 1949. 45 Sec-
ond, the military commanders for India and Pakistan agreed upon a
cease-fire line to be supervised by the U.N. Military Observer Group
in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) under the Karachi Agreement,
which was signed on July 22, 1949."
After the cease-fire agreement, the UN accomplished little in
Kashmir. In 1965 and 1971 the dispute over Kashmir flared into
large-scale conflict, resulting in minor adjustments to the cease-fire
line.' 7 To this day, sporadic fighting continues between Indian and
Pakistani troops for possession of the Siachen Glacier in the Saltoro
37. Id. (citing S.C. Res. of 21 Apr. 1948). A plebiscite is a direct vote on an important
issue by an entire people. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 526 (2d ed. 1983).
38. Alam, supra note 1, at 64-65.
39. Id. at 65.






46. Karachi Agreement, July 27, 1949, India-Pakistan, part. 11(1), 81 U.N.T.S. 273,
282 [hereinafter Karachi Agreement).
47. See generally J. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES 61 (1987)
[hereinafter J. PRScoTr] (detailing the shifts in the cease-fire line since 1947); Desmond,
War at the Top of the World, TIME, July 31, 1989, at 26 [hereinafter Desmond].
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Range."' Moreover, many fear that current tensions over Kashmir
may plunge India and Pakistan into an unprecedented full-scale war
where both sides possess nuclear forces.4
III. Accession
On October 26, 1947, the Maharaja, without reference to his
subjects, executed an Instrument of Accession in favor of the govern-
ment of India. 0 The Maharaja's accession was formally accepted
the following day by Governor-general, Lord Mountbatten. 1 How-
ever, by this time Kashmir was, in effect, divided into three distinct
sectors: Azad Kashmir, "Legal" Kashmir and the Gilgit region. 2
A. Legality of Accession
Two days before the Maharaja signed his Instrument of Acces-
sion to India, the Poonch rebels and their tribesman-allies set up the
Azad Kashmir government headquartered at Muzaffarabad.5 3 Addi-
tionally, there was "Legal" Kashmir, the regime set up by the Ma-
haraja under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah, which came into
effect in March, 1948."' Finally, there was the Gilgit region, com-
prising approximately one-third of the state's area, which passed vir-
tually without conflict into Pakistani hands during the course of the
last three months of 1947. 55
1. Competence to Transfer Sovereignty.-Indian writers as-
sert that the Maharaja was competent to transfer all of Kashmir to
India." State succession, whether by violent annexation, peaceful
cession or by other means, occurs when one state is substituted for
another in soyereignty over a given territory.17 Sovereignty is the key
word here. The Maharaja did not exercise sovereignty over the
48. Desmond, supra note 47, at 26.
49. Spector, India-Pakistan War: It Could Be Nuclear, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1990, sec.
A, at 23, col. 2.
Though neither state is thought to have deployed nuclear weapons as yet,
both could do so within weeks. A leader of the militant Hindu B.J.P. Party-a
part of Prime Minister V.P. Singh's parliamentary coalition in India-has de-
clared, for example, that if war comes, "Pakistan will cease to exist." In con-
trast, the hostilities between Chinese and Soviet forces in the late 1960's-the
only time two nuclear states actually clashed-were limited to skirmishes for
control of a remote border area.
Id.
50. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 35.
51. Id.




56. H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 33.
57. See D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 3 (1956).
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Gilgit region, which constituted one-third of Kashmir.58
Under international law, if a dispute arises as to sovereignty
over a portion of territory where one party has actually displayed
sovereignty, it is not enough for the other party to show territorial
sovereignty once existed; it must also be shown that the territorial
sovereignty has continued to exist and did exist at the time critical to
deciding the dispute." This demonstration consists of the actual dis-
play of state activities that may be performed only by a territorial
sovereign."0 "The principle that continuous and peaceful display of
the functions of state within a given region is a constituent element
of territorial sovereignty is . . .based on . . international jurispru-
dence and doctrine widely accepted . . .,.
Although sovereignty was exercised over the rest of Kashmir,
the Maharaja's predecessors were, at best, only partially successful
in bringing the Gilgit region under Dogra rule.62 By the 1890s, it
was the British Agent at Gilgit who wielded the real authority
there. 63 In 1935, the British leased Gilgit from Kashmir for sixty
years, but surrendered their lease on the eve of partition." In theory,
sovereignty reverted to Kashmir, but the Maharaja was never able to
make this sovereignty effective in any way.66 When the Maharaja
sent a governor to Gilgit, the Gilgit Scouts imprisoned him and
turned the territory over to Pakistan.66 In light of this fact, it is clear
that the Maharaja did not perform the activities of a territorial sov-
ereign in the Gilgit region. As such, the Maharaja had never exer-
cised sovereignty over the region, and could not transfer more rights
than he possessed.67 Therefore, India did not receive the Gilgit re-
gion, now possessed by Pakistan, under the Instrument of Accession.
2. Possession by Occupation.-Occupation is the act of appro-
priation by a state through which it intentionally acquires sover-
eignty over such territory that is not under the sovereignty of an-
other state.68 The occupied territory must have, been terra nullius,
58. See A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 66.
59. H. BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 239, 240 (2d ed. 1952) (citing Island of Palmas
Case, (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) (dispute over Spain's
capability to cede the Island of Palmas to the U.S.)) [hereinafter H. BRIGGS].
60. Id.
61. Id. at 241.




66. H.S. GURURAJ RAO, supra note 2, at 101. Under British rule, Gilgit had been the
responsibility of a body called the Gilgit Scouts commanded by British officers. Id. at 100.
67. H. BRIGGS, supra note 59, at 242.
68. N. HILL CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 146
(1945).
Winter 1991]
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without owner, and the occupation must have been real or "effec-
tive."8 9 Effective occupation occurs when there is an announced in-
tention to acquire the territory, and actual settlement or occupation
with the assertion of governmental authority has taken place.70
As previously shown, after the British surrendered their lease on
the eve of partition, the Gilgit region was a terra nullius.7 1 At the
time of accession, under the August 1947 Standstill Agreement, Pa-
kistan alone was responsible for administering services in Kashmir
such as the post, telegraph and railways.7 2 These services were the
beginning of Pakistan's establishment of government authority over
the region. This process was completed after the territory was trans-
ferred to Pakistan by the Gilgit Scouts. 73 Since this time, Pakistan
has claimed the Gilgit region, formerly a terra nullius, as part of its
territory, keeping it beyond the control of the Azad Kashmir author-
ities and making it an integral part of Pakistan.74 In doing so, Paki-
stan has established governmental control sufficient to provide secur-
ity to life and property. Thus, Pakistan effectively occupies the Gilgit
region to the exclusion of India.
3. Provisional Accession.-At the outset, there was a clear
declaration by India that the Kashmir accession contained within it
a definite provisional element . The accession was brought about as
an emergency measure to meet the crisis of an invasion by Moslem
tribesmen and once the crisis was met, required ratification in some
form by the people of the state.76 The general rules of interpreting
treaties apply in this situation. [I]n treaty interpretation, three major
factors are pertinent: (a) the text of the treaty expressing the agree-
ment of the parties, (b) the intention of the parties, as a subjective
element, and (c) the object and purpose of the treaty.77 The "text of
the treaty" in this case is the Instrument of Accession and the ac-
ceptance by the Governor-general of India. While the Instrument of
Accession makes no reference to the will of the people, the Indian
acceptance of accession came in the form of two letters: One was a
formal statement by Mountbatten, the Governor-general, that "I
hereby accept this Instrument of Accession.1"78 The second was a
personal letter in reply to a letter from the Maharaja, in which the
69. Id.
70. Id. at 146-47.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 50-67.
72. Alam, supra note 1, at 62.
73. See supra text accompanying note 66.
74. See A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 66.
75. Id. at 35.
76. Id. at 35-36.
77. T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES, 72, 74 (1974) [hereinafter T. ELIAS].
78. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 46.
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reasons for seeking to accede were outlined. 9 In this letter,
Mountbatten stated that "it is my government's wish that as soon as
law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of
the invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by
a reference to the people." 80
This second letter is a document that should be regarded as in-
cluded in the context of the accession because it is an agreement
relating to the accession which was made between the parties in con-
nection with the conclusion of the Accession Agreement. 1 As such,
the letter should be treated as part of the context of the Accession
Agreement for the purpose of giving meaning to the terms of the
Instrument of Accession and its acceptance.82 That was agreed to by
both parties is evidenced by Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal
Nehru's radio broadcast from New Delhi on November 2, 1947.83 In
this broadcast, Nehru stated that the fate of Kashmir was ultimately
to be decided by the people.8" "That pledge we have given, and the
Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir, but to
the world. We are prepared when peace and law and order have
been established, to have a referendum held under international aus-
pices like the United Nations. '"85
Therefore, though there was no mention of provisional accession
in this Instrument of Accession or the formal acceptance, it clearly
was part of the instrument. The provisional character of the acces-
sion and the need for an eventual reference to the will of the people,
reaffirmed on several occasions by Jawaharlal Nehru, gave rise to
the whole issue of a Kashmir plebiscite.8 6 This carried with it the
possibility that the people might opt for independence or union with
Pakistan.
79. Id. The reasons stated in the Maharaja's letter were the uprisings in the Poonch
region and the tribal invasion. Id.
80. Id.
81. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31, para. 2; reprinted in T. EuAS, supra note 77, at 227-56; Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15 (1986) [hereinafter Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties]: "The context for purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(1) Any igreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in con-
nection with the conclusion of the treaty."
82. T. ELIS, supra note 77, at 75 (discussing the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 81): "The other documents that should be regarded as comprised in the
'context' are of two types: (i) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made in connec-
tion with the conclusion of the treaty .... " Id.
83. Alam, supra note 1, at 69 (citing Radio broadcast from New Delhi by Indian Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (Nov. 2, 1947)).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. A. LAMB, -supra note 3, at 47.
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B. Accession in Context with Other Events
India makes much of the fact that the accession was accepted
by Sheikh Abdullah and his party, the National Conference.8 7 How-
ever, India makes no mention of the fact that on the eve of partition,
the Maharaja had imprisoned the leaders of both the Muslim Con-
ference and the National Conference.8" Abdullah, who was strongly
influenced by the Indian National Congress, had been released from
prison a month before accession after visits to Kashmir by Congress
members.89 In contrast, Muslim Conference leader, Ghulam Abbas,
influenced by the Muslim League of Pakistan, remained in prison
and his party remained underground.9" Moreover, Abdullah ratified
the accession to India in return for promises of extensive local auton-
omy for Kashmir but Kashmir's special status has been whittled
away over the years.91
Indian commentators emphasize the legality of India's acts,
condemning Pakistan for the use of force and coercion. 92 However,
such arguments must be viewed with an eye on India's overall con-
duct. Junagadh, one of the three Indian states which had not deter-
mined their future at the time of partition, consisted of a Hindu ma-
jority ruled by a Moslem dynasty. 93 Here, India rejected the Moslem
ruler's decision to accede to Pakistan.94 In violation of the Standstill
87. H.S. GURURAJ RAO, supra note 2, at 39.
88. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 36.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at 42.
91. MacFarquhar, The Kashmir Question, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 11,
1990, at 42, 44 [hereinafter MacFarquhar]. For example, Article 370 of the Constitution of
India provides:
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution-
(a) the provisions of Art. 238 [sic] shall not apply in relation to the'
State [sic] of Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State [sic]
shall be limited to-
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List
which, in consultation with the Government [sic] of the State [sic]
of Jammu and Kashmir], are declared by the President to corre-
spond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession gov-
erning the accession of the State [sic] to the Dominion of India as
the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may
make laws for the State [sic].
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, art. 370, reprinted in H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 341-42,
n. 111. However, such autonomy is rendered meaningless in view of the fact that the current
Governor of Kashmir, Girish Saxena is a former chief of India's main intelligence agency and
has vowed to continued India's crackdown on the armed Kashmiri militants. This crackdown
was initiated by former Governor Jagmohan, who was removed in May, 1990 after security
forces fired on a procession of unarmed mourners of a murdered Moslem prelate. Coil, 100,000
Demonstrate in Kashmir, Wash. Post, June 1, 1990, at A29, col. 1.
92. See H.S. GURURA; RAO, supra note 2, at 37; H.O. AGARWAL, KASHMIR PROB-
LEM-ITs LEGAL ASPECTS 31, 49 (1980) [hereinafter H.O. AGARWAL].
93. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 15.
94. The India-Pakistan Question, 1948 U.N.Y.B. 400, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.13 [here-
inafter The India-Pakistan Question].
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Agreement with Pakistan, the Indian government cut off all commu-
nications and supplies.98 While exchanges over this action were tak-
ing place between the governments of India and Pakistan, a provi-
sional government of Junagadh was set up in Indian territory and
had taken possession of certain Junagadh property in that territory.96
This occupation by Indian troops occurred on October 22, 1947, the
very same day that the Pathan tribesmen, incited by the massacre of
Moslems in Jammu, invaded Kashmir . 7 India's military occupation
occurred months before Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir.
Indian possession of the state of Junagadh was ratified by plebi-
scite in February of 1948." As Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan,
the government of Pakistan regarded this as a direct act of hostility
on the part of the Indian government against Pakistan. 99
IV. Charges of Aggression
Indian commentators brand Pakistan as the aggressor in Kash-
mir, using force and coercion to usurp the territory. 10 But here
again, India's claims must be considered in context with its words
and deeds elsewhere. India's treatment of Junagadh and Hyderabad
must be considered in viewing Pakistan's actions in Kashmir and its
claim of anticipatory self-defense.
A. Coercion and Aggression
India claims that economic sanctions were used by Pakistan to
coerce Kashmir's accession to Pakistan in violation of the Standstill
Agreement.101 However, Pakistan asserted that the stoppage in sup-
plies was due to a transportation crisis in West Punjab resulting
from the chaotic conditions existing at the time.1 02
Regardless of the, truth of this statement, it must be
remembered that India used an economic blockade against Juna-
gadh, cutting off all communications and supplies in violation of a
standstill agreement with Pakistan. 03 India denied the use of eco-
nomic sanctions, blaming the supply stoppage on the chaos resulting
from the breakdown of the administration of Junagadh. °4 Further-
95. Id.
96. Id. The use of the term Junagadh here includes the petty states of Mangrol and
Manavadar.
.97. Id. Manavadar was occupied by Indian troops and its ruler removed on October 22,
1947. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
98. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 15.
99. The India-Pakistan Question, supra note 94, at 400.
100. H.S. GURURAJ RAO, supra note 2, at 44.
101. H.O. AGARWAL, supra note 92, at 31.
102. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 43-44.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 92-100.
104. The India-Pakistan Question, supra note 94, at 400.
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more, India used economic sanctions again against Hyderabad, the
third undecided Indian state, during 1948 in an attempt to force its
Moslem ruler to accede his Hindu-majority state to India.10 5 When
this failed, India resorted to military occupation in September, 1948
to achieve its objective. 0
In addition, India accuses Pakistan of aiding and abetting
Pakistini tribesmen, in conducting raids across its entire border with
Kashmir by providing weapons, supplies and Pakistani troops before
Kashmir's accession to India. 0° As previously mentioned, the
Poonch rebels of the Azad Kashmir liberation movement appear to
have established contact with the Pathan tribesmen in Pakistan
where they sought arms made in village workshops.108 These links
played a role in the Pathan tribal invasion of Kashmir. 0 9 When
news of the massacres in Jammu reached the tribesmen they joined
forces with the Azad Kashmir forces and invaded Kashmir on Octo-
ber 22, 1947.110 Evidence suggests that, as claimed by Pakistan, the
Pakistani government lost control in the Kashmir crisis and was una-
ble to control the tribesmen.' As asserted by historian Alistair
Lamb, it is unlikely that Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Pakistani Gov-
ernor-general, could have stopped the tribesmen and their sympa-
thizers from intervening in Kashmir, even had he known what was
afoot."' It would probably be as fair to blame Jinnah for the tribal
outrages in Kashmir as to blame Jawaharlal Nehru and his col-
leagues for the massacres of Moslems by Sikhs and Hindus in
Jammu."13
Nevertheless, Indian writers still argue that Pakistan is to
blame. 1 4 H.S. Gururaj Rao asserts that:
The State [sic] which knows that an individual is plotting
an unlawful act against a foreign State [sic] and does not pre-
vent it when it should have done so; and the State [sic] which
receives an offender and screens him from punishment by refus-
ing either to extradite or punish him, become in a certain man-
ner accomplices in the commission of the offenses, a kind of soli-
darity is created between them and the culprit, derived from the
tacit approval of the act; and from this approval, and not from
the relationship between the individual and the State [sic],
105. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 15.
106. Id.
107. Alam, supra note 1, at 63; S.P. SHUXLA, supra note 29, at 4.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 19-28.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 51.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 46.
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arises the responsibility of the State [sic]. 15
But as mentioned before, Pakistan lost control of the situation and
could not have prevented it even if it had known of the problem be-
forehand.11 In addition, Pakistan would not have been dealing with
an individual offender, but tribes of offenders which it did not have
the power to stop in the first place.' 17 It is likely that punishment for
this act would have caused violence and unrest in Pakistan. How-
ever, this became a moot point upon Pakistan's decision to commit
troops to Kashmir.
B. Anticipatory Self-Defense
Pakistan committed troops to Kashmir on May 8, 1948, defend-
ing such action on the grounds of anticipatory self-defense."" In sup-
port of India, writers argue that while this is acceptable under cus-
tomary international law, it is limited under article 51 of the U.N.
Charter to defense against armed attack." 9 India was the only U.N.
member to object to Pakistan's justification of anticipatory self-de-
fense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 20
Article 51 acknowledges the inherent right of self-defense. 2' It
seems to allow that interpretation must take into account a basic and
natural law right of self-defense beyond limitations created by man-
made law.' 22 Therefore, the content of the right to self-defense
would basically be greater than that which the charter gives it.' 23
From debates during and after the adoption of the U.N. Char-
ter, and in particular on the formulation of the concept of aggres-
sion, it seems unlikely that article 51 excludes anticipatory action.'
The traditional test for justified self-defense requires that there must
be a "necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment of deliberation," and the action
taken must not be "unreasonable or excessive, and must be "limited
by that necessity and kept clearly within it.' ' 25
115. Id.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
117. Id.
118. Alam, supra note 1, at 66.
119. H.O. AGARWAL, supra note 92, at 48; U.N. CHARTER, art. 51: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member [sic] of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
120. 1 D.O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 317 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter D.
O'CONNELL].
121. See supra note 119.
122. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 120, at 317.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 316 (citing The Caroline Case (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), (1837)). "[lIt seems un-
likely that members would agree that the Article excludes anticipatory action, or that it has
abrogated the doctrine in The Caroline." Id.
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In the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan has a strong argument in sup-
port of the necessity of self-defense. Before partition, Britain's idea
of partitioning India was greeted with distaste by the Hindu major-
ity in the Indian national movement.1 26 The Hindu majority refused
to acknowledge the validity of the "two-nation" theory of Moham-
med Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League; that the subcontinent con-
tained two separate and incompatible elements, Hindu and Mos-
lem. 117 The "one-nation" school of thought viewed partition as a
temporary situation. 28 Pakistan would soon pass away in the face of
a reunited Indian State.'29 To the "one-nation" school, Pakistan had
no right to exist and should never have been allowed to happen. 180
During the course of 1947-48, the "one-nation" theory could be
seen at work in the policies of the government of India toward Kash-
mir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. In Junagadh, the Moslem ruler's ac-
cession to Pakistan was rejected, and Indian possession of the state
was ratified by its Hindu majority in February 1948, by a plebi-
scite. '3 In Hyderabad, the Moslem ruler's question for independence
was challenged by an Indian economic blockade, followed in Septem-
ber 1948 by Indian military occupation. 13 2
In view of India's past exercise of the "one-nation" policy, it is
possible to understand Pakistan's fear embodied in the accusation
that "the object of the various acts of aggression by India against
Pakistan is the destruction of the state of Pakistan."'3 3 In addition,
the Indian Army, now occupying neighboring Kashmir, possessed at
least twice the armed might of Pakistan at the time of partition.'3 4
In view of these facts and Kashmir's contiguous border with Paki-
stan, the necessity to deal quickly with this threat on Pakistan's bor-
ders is evident. Furthermore, Pakistan's action was not unreasonable
or excessive and was limited by necessity. At no time did the number
of Pakistani troops in Kashmir outnumber the Indian forces present
there.'
Article 51 requires that measures taken by members in the ex-
ercise of the right of self-defense shall immediately be reported to
126. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 13; J. KORBEL, DANGER IN KAsHMIR 43 (1954) (herein-
after J. KORBEL].




131. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99.
132. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 15.
133. Alam, supra note 1, at 63.
134. S.P. SHUKLA, supra note 29, at 2-3. The comparative figures of armed forces be-
tween India and Pakistan after the partition were as follows: armored regiments 12:6; artillery
regiments 18:8; engineer regiments 61:34; infantry regiments 15:8; transport units 34:17 and
hospitals 82:34. Id.
135. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 52.
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the Security Council. 3 " While it is obvious for strategic reasons why
Pakistan did not inform the Security Council before it committed
troops on May 8, 1948, it is unclear why it waited until UNCIP
arrived on July 7, 1948 to inform them of its actions.37
Furthermore, there is the problem that Pakistan's anticipatory
self-defense came after the Security Council had established UNCIP
to help resolve the Kashmir dispute and maintain international peace
and security, as required by article 51.138 However, in considering
the extent to which the U.N. Charter today has limited the scope of
self-defense, one cannot ignore the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
international machinery as a substitute for individual action. 189 If
the law is ineffective the primordial right of self-defense must reas-
sert itself.'40
At the time Pakistan exercised its right to self-defense, the Se-
curity Council had not yet taken measures necessary to maintain in-
ternational peace and security. As of May 8, the Security Council
had only created UNCIP and determined the five members who
would make up the commission."" As of May 8, 1948, the Security
Council had yet to take any action that would maintain peace and
security in Kashmir or neutralize the very real threat of further im-
plementation of India's "one-nation" policy. 42 India had already ac-
cused Pakistan of aggression based on the invasion of Kashmir by
tribesmen, Pakistani nationals and soldiers on leave. 143 India could
easily have used this as justification to achieve the final goal of its
''one-nation" policy.
Indian writers have asserted that other states should not recog-
nize Pakistan's title over territory it occupies in Kashmir, as such
gains were made by force.'4" For reasons previously demonstrated,
this argument does not apply to Pakistan's claim to the Gilgit re-
gion.'45 While there may be no adequate legal response to this
charge as it applies to the rest of Kashmir, it can be argued that "it
had always been understood that in assuring the option of accession
to either Dominion, the Indian states concerned would not take an"
arbitrary decision, but would take into account considerations such
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 35-56; U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
139. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 120, at 315.
140. Id.
141. Alam, supra note 1, at 66. The composition of UNCIP was completed by May 7,
1948. Id.
142. See supra text and accompanying notes 126-134.
143. See supra text accompanying note 107.
144. H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 37 (citing the Bogota Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States, April 30, 1948).
145. See supra text and accompanying notes 56-74.
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as geographical contiguity. "6 While this may be a weak argument, it
is, nonetheless, the very argument used by the Indian representative
to the U.N. to justify its economic blockade and military occupation
of Junagadh. 47
As already discussed, Kashmir had strong economic and cul-
tural ties with Pakistan. The state possessed an 80% Moslem major-
ity, and most of its exports entered the world market after passing
through Pakistan.148 In addition, the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus riv-
ers flowed from Kashmir into Pakistan, bringing life to the agricul-
ture of the Punjab."19 Moreover, the best roads in Kashmir lead to
Pakistan. 50 The one route from India to Jammu, by way of
Pathankot, was more of theoretical than practical utility.1 51 Pakistan
also had a standstill agreement with Kashmir whereby, pending final
settlement of Kashmir's future, Pakistan would continue those ser-
vices which had been carried out for Kashmir under the British by
the Punjab government. 5 2 Finally, in addition to all of these factors,
Kashmir has a contiguous border with Pakistan. Continuing with the
logical of this argument, Pakistan is no less capable than India of
deciding when another state has made an arbitrary decision. 15 Tak-
ing all of the factors into account, "by all rules of reason, [Kashmir]
ought to have acceded to . . . [Pakistan].'"
After presentation of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Coun-
cil, the majority of its members continued to keep the main focus on
a plebiscite and how, to bring it about. 55 Columbian representative,
Carlos P. Romulo, speaking in the Security Council on January 24,
1957 stated:
I do not think that the Council is called upon to make any
finding whether there has been aggression or by whom it was
committed. The charge and counter-charge ceased to be relevant
the minute both sides agreed to the resolution of UNCIP of 13
August 1948 and 5 January 1949.16
H.S. Guraraj Rao says that public utterances such as these by mem-
bers of the Security Council demonstrate their ignorance of the
background of the "Kashmir problem," because at no time has India
146. The India-Pakistan Question, supra note 94, at 400.
147. Id.
148. See supra text and accompanying notes 8-15.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. A. LAma, supra note 3, at 22.
152. Id. at 43.
153. The India-Pakistan Question, supra note 94, at 400.
154. Id. "By all rules of reason, Junagadh and the other States [sic] whose accession
was in dispute ought to have acceded to the Indian Union." Id.
155. H.S. GURURAi RAo, supra note 2, at 54.
156. Id. at 54-55.
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withdrawn its charge of aggression.157 However, such utterances may
show that the members of the Security Council do understand the
background of the Kashmir dispute.
V. United Nations Involvement and the Plebiscite Issue
As previously mentioned, when UNCIP arrived in Pakistan on
July 7, 1948, and discovered that war was raging between India and
Pakistan, it shifted emphasis of its mediatory influence to efforts to
effect a cease-fire. This was to be followed by a truce agreement
providing for demilitarization, which would permit holding of a free
and impartial plebiscite throughout Kashmir. 15 ' The results of the
Commission's efforts were agreements embodied in the Commission's
resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.159 These were
accepted by the parties to the dispute and implemented by a cessa-
tion of hostilities on January 1, 1949, and the establishment of a
cease-fire on July 22, 1949.11°
Regarding the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission
submitted a three-part proposal calling for cease-fire, a truce agree-
ment, and a plebiscite to determine the future status of Kashmir. 61
The following principles were suggested as a basis for the truce
agreement: (1) The government of Pakistan was to withdraw its
troops and use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal of
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident in the
area.162 (2) "Pending a final solution," the territory evacuated by
Pakistani troops was to be "administered by the local authorities
under the surveillance of the Commission." 16 (3) After the Commis-
sion notified the government of India that tribesmen and Pakistani
nationals had withdrawn, the government of India would agree to
withdraw the bulk of its forces from the state "in stages to be agreed
upon with the Commission. 1 64 (4) The government of India would
maintain, "within lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the
minimum strength of its forces which, in agreement with the Com-
mission, were considered necessary to assist the local authorities in
the observance of law and order. 1 65 While Pakistan's initial attempt
157. Id. at 55.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
159. Alam, supra note 1, at 66.
160. Karachi Agreement, supra note 46, at 280, Part II(B)(1).
161. Resolution For a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement Adopted By the United
Nations Commission on India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 (contained in report to the
Secretary-General on 6 September 1948) at 3, U.N. Dec. S/995 (1948) [hereinafter Resolu-
tion of 13 August 1948].




165. Id. at 66-67.
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to conditionally accept the proposals was treated as a refusal, it later
accepted the resolution as part of UNCIP's resolution of 5 January
1949.166
A. The Plebiscite Issue
The UNCIP's plebiscite proposals, embodied in the resolution of
5 January 1949, departed from the Security Council's plebiscite pro-
posals of April 21, 1948 by making concessions on points to which
India had objected.' The government of Kashmir, headed by
Sheikh Abdullah as prime minister, was to be left unaltered." 8 The
plebiscite administrator, to be named by the U.N. Secretary-General
in agreement with the Commission, was to be appointed to office by
the government of Kashmir." 9 He was to derive from the state the
powers that he should consider necessary to organize and conduct
the plebiscite and ensure its freedom and impartiality.170 Final dispo-
sal of Indian and state armed forces was to be determined by the
commission and plebiscite administrator in consultation with the
government of India after implementing the cease-fire and truce pro-
posals of the 13 August resolution:'" In the territory held by Paki-
stan, Azad Kashmir, and other pro-Pakistan forces, the 5 January
resolution provided that final disposition of the armed forces here
would be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Adminis-
trator in consultation with the local authorities. 72
Pakistan has found India's treatment of the plebiscite issue in
Kashmir frustrating, since India has followed a purely legalistic
stand in Kashmir, while it acted quite differently in Junagadh and
Hyderabad. 78 In Junagadh, India insisted that the question of ac-
cession should be decided by a plebiscite held under the joint super-
vision of India and Junagadh.'" As previously discussed, India used
an economic blockade to ensure that Pakistan, to whom Junagadh
had already acceded, did not participate in the organizing and hold-
ing of the plebiscite.' If this principle were to be followed in this
case, India would have nothing to do with the plebiscite in Kashmir,
leaving the matter to the joint supervision of Pakistan and Kash-
mir.' 76 However, a plebiscite, in any form, has yet to take place.' 7









175. See supra text and accompanying notes 92-99.
176. Alam, supra note 1, at 70.
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1. Problems of Implementation.-Since 1949, it has become
evident that India refuses to agree to demilitarization in any form or
sequence so as to permit a free and impartial plebiscite.178 This re-
fusal first presented itself as a matter of interpretation of the 13 Au-
gust and 5 January resolutions.17 1
Two problems arose over interpretation of the 13 August and 5
January resolutions. The first problem was political. India under-
stood that the "local authorities" who were to administer the terri-
tory in Azad Kashmir meant the state government headed by Sheikh
Abdullah; while Pakistan believed the term "local authorities"
meant the Azad Kashmir government. 80 The second disagreement
arose over the method by which the withdrawal of Pakistani and In-
dian troops would be synchronized. 8'
In an effort to break this deadlock, on August 26, 1949, the
Commission proposed arbitration regarding the issues raised relating
to Part II of the 13 August resolution. 82 The arbitrator was to de-
cide the questions according to equity and his decision was to be
binding on the parties. 8 Pakistan accepted the proposal, but India
rejected it." On August 13, India also rejected a similar proposal
for arbitration by President Truman and British Prime Minister
Attlee. 185
On December 17, 1949, the Security Council asked its Presi-
dent, General A.G.L. McNaughton of Canada, to meet with India
and Pakistan to settle the outstanding issues."" McNaughton met
informally with the parties to search for a mutually satisfactory ba-
sis for dealing with the questions at issue. 8" In general, Pakistan
accepted McNaughton's proposals, but India did not.' A Security
Council resolution based on these proposals, adopted on March 14,
1950, was similarly rejected by India. This resolution also replaced




180. Id. at 71.
181. Id.
182. Id. (citing Part II of Resolution of 13 August 1948, supra note 161, at 3, regard-




186. Id. at 72.
187. Id. McNaughton proposed: (a) the withdrawal of Pakistani regular forces; and the
withdrawal of Indian regular forces not needed to keep law and order on the Indian side of the
cease-fire line; (b) the reduction, by disbanding and disarming of local forces, including on the
one side, the armed forces and militia of the state of Kashmir and on the other, the Azad
forces; (c) the inclusion of the northern area in this program of demilitarization and its contin-
ued administration by the existing local authorities, subject to U.N. supervision. Id. at 72-73.
188. Id. at 73.
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place.' 19
U.N. Representative, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, in his report
to the Security Council in September 1950, proposed a limited or
partial plebiscite, but this was rejected by both parties.190 Pakistan
would accept nothing less than a plebiscite that would settle the fate
of the entire state, while India would not accept even a partial plebi-
scite in the Vale of Kashmir. 19
In reports to the Security Council in 1952, U.N. Representative
Dr. Frank P. Graham noted that the principal points of difference
between the parties continued to be the quality of forces each should
maintain after demilitarization and the time when the plebiscite ad-
ministrator should assume his duties." 2
B. Resolution of 13 August 1948 Disputed
To this day, although in changing forms and for varying rea-
sons, India has persisted in its original refusal of demilitarization in
any form or sequence so as, to permit a free and impartial plebi-
scite. 98 In 1957, at the request of the Security Council, its Presi-
dent, Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, went to the subcontinent in an at-
tempt to make progress towards settlement of the dispute. " Jarring
noted that both governments adhered to the resolutions of 13 August
and 5 January; but the government of India confronted Jarring, con-
tending that Part I of the 13 August resolution, Sections B and E
had not been implemented by Pakistan. 95 India argued that Parts II
and III were contingent upon implementation of Part 1.196 Therefore,
there was no question of implementing Parts II and III or the'5 Jan-
uary resolution which dealt with the plebiscite."" Pakistan con-
tended that Part I had been met, and that it was time to proceed
with demilitarization under Part II, to prepare for implementation of
189. Id. (citing S.C. Res. of 14 March 1950).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 74.
192. Id. Dixon was prepared to accept the view that Pakistan violated international law
when its troops crossed into Kashmir. He suggested that Pakistan withdraw its forces first,
then Indian troops should be withdrawn and both the Kashmir state forces and Azad Kashmir
forces should be disbanded. Dixon also proposed appointment of political agents representing
the U.N. in the northern areas and attaching U.N. officers with supervisory powers to magis-
trates on either side of the cease-fire line for the rest of Kashmir. As an alternative, Dixon
suggested the establishment of a unified government for the entire state during the period of
the plebiscite. These suggestions were rejected by India. Id.
193. Id. at 75. India was willing to negotiate on the difference over the number and
character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of demilitarization.
However, it rejected the proposal that the plebiscite administrator-designate be associated with
the U.N. Representative in further talks with the parties. Id.
194. Id. at 70.
195. Id. at 79.
196. Id.
197. See H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 94.
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the 5 January resolution. 198
1. Resolution of 13 August Part L Section B.-This section of
the 13 August resolution deals with the augmentation of military
potential." India asserts that after the resolutions of 13 August and
5 January were adopted, Pakistan violated Part I, Section B by
training and maintaining the Azad Kashmir forces.2 0 In support of
this argument, reference is made to an UNCIP report to the Secur-
ity Council which notes that the 13 August resolution did not record
the presence of the Azad Kashmir.20 1 However, this is a correction of
an oversight, not confirmation of a large-scale program of training
and equipping the Azad Kashmir forces. Moreover, it makes no ref-
erence to equipping the Azad Kashmir forces after the resolutions.
In addition, in a December 9, 1953 letter to the Pakistani Prime
Minister, the Indian Prime Minister held that Pakistan's entry into a
military aid agreement with the United States, as part of its mem-
bership in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), would
create a whole new situation.0 This would seriously change rela-
tions between the two countries and would have a direct bearing on
the demilitarization of the Kashmir state. 03 It is argued that Part I,
Section B totally prohibited India and Pakistan from taking any
measures that would have had the effect of increasing the striking
capacity of the forces on either side of the cease-fire line.?° The
198. Id.
199. Alam, supra note 1, at 79.
200. Resolution of 13 August 1948, supra note 161, at 3, Part I, § B: "The High Com-
mands of India and Pakistan agree to refrain from taking any measures that augment the
military potential of the forces under their control in the State [sic] of Jammu and Kashmir
(for purposes of these proposals "forces under their control shall be considered to indicate all
forces, organized and unorganized, fighting or participating in hostilities on their respective
sides)." Id.
201. H.S. GURURAJ RAO, supra note 2, at 92. "It is true that Pakistan, after the adop-
tion of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, has introduced into the territory
of Kashmir occupied by its huge quantities of military equipment and has been mainly instru-
mental in training, equipping, and modernizing the Azad Kashmir forces. The UNCIP has
laid down in categorical terms that Pakistan was responsible for increasing the military poten-
tial of the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire." Id.
202. Id. at 349 n.211.
The Commission says in paragraph 203: "The resolution of 13 August 1948
... did not, however, record a second element which has developed subse-
quently into a serious problem in the implementation of that resolution: The
Azad (free) Kashmir movement, whose fighting forces today number some 32
well-equipped battalions. This movement, Muslim [sic] in character, has become
the centre [sic] of strong and violent resistance to the accession of the state of
India. It controls a considerable part of the western area of the State [sic],
claims to be fully organized as a government and its political activities appear to
be directed towards the accession of the State [sic] of Pakistan" ..
Id.
203. See id. at 75 (citing Letter from Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to
Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammed All (December 9, 1953)).
204. Id.
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UNCIP and the Security Council expected to settle the Kashmir dis-
pute soon after both parties agreed to be bound by the terms of the
13 August- and 5 January resolutions and they were surprised at the
obstacles they found in their way.205 In view of this fact, it cannot be
expected that the Security Council intended compliance with the res-
olution to require the armed forces of both countries to remain at a
1948 level of advancement until the dispute was settled. Nor does it
appear that India believed this argument either. From independence
in 1947 to 1965 both countries allotted between 30 and 60% of their
yearly budgets for defense. 6
2. Resolution 13 August Part I, Section E.-"The Govern-
ment [sic] of India and the Government [sic] of Pakistan agree to
appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintain-
ing an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of further negotia-
tions. '20 7 India accuses Pakistan's political leaders and press of a
"campaign of war and hatred" in violation of Part I, Section E of
the 13 August resolution.208 However, both parties are guilty of fail-
ing to create a favorable atmosphere for further negotiations.
As previously discussed, the "one-nation" theory could be seen
at work in India's policy towards Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kash-
mir in 1947 and 1948.209 The Hindu majority of the Indian national
movement had refused to accept the "two-nation" theory of the Mo-
hammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. 10 Some Hindu ex-
tremists saw partition in terms of religious war and felt it was their
duty to defend the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir against the forces of
Islam."' Josef Korbel states that the real cause of "all the bitterness
and bloodshed, all the envenomed speech, the recalcitrance and the
suspicion that have characterized the Kashmir dispute is the uncom-
promisable struggle of two ways of life, two concepts of political or-
ganization, two scales of values, two spiritual attitudes that find
themselves locked in deadly conflict ....
Emotions this strongly felt by both sides are not eliminated
overnight by agreement to a U.N. resolution, nor were they. In 1962,
after a four year lapse in the Security Council's consideration of the
Kashmir dispute, it was again brought to their attention by Pakistani
205. Id. at 92.
206. See generally Alam, supra note 1, at 68-80 (outlining the Security Council's re-
peated attempts to resolve interpretation disagreements from 1949 to 1965).
207. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 87.
208. Resolution of 13 August 1948, supra note 161, at 3, Part I, § E.
209. H.S. GURURAJ RAO, supra note 2, at 92-3.
210. See supra text and accompanying notes 126-34.
211. Id.
212. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 40.
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delegate, Zafrullah Kahn, in protest against certain bellicose
speeches by Indian statesmen calling for the "liberation" of Azad
Kashmir.21 Such emotions have persisted throughout the course of
the Kashmir dispute and still exist today.1
The U.N. Charter calls on its members "to fulfill in good faith
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the . . . Char-
ter. '"1 5 India was under a duty to use good faith in meeting its obli-
gations under the 13 August resolutions. In addition, the resolution
should be interpreted in good faith in light of its object and pur-
pose."' 6 As such, either state's expectation regarding the require-
ments of Part I, Section E should have been tempered by reason and
good faith.
As previously mentioned, India argues that Part I, Section B of
the 13 August resolution prohibited any measures that would in-
crease the striking capacity of the forces on either side of the cease-
fire line." But from 1947 to 1965, India allotted 30 to 60% of its
yearly budget on defense. 1 India accuses Pakistan of waging a
"campaign of war and hatred in violation of Part I, Section E of the
13 August resolution, while such emotions have been shown to be
present on both sides. " India's unreasonable claims and expecta-
tions can be seen as stalling in bad faith to escape its plebiscite obli-
gations under the 13 August and 5 January resolutions.
C. Binding Force of the 13 August and 5 January Resolutions
In addition to the argument that Pakistan has not met Part I of
the 13 August resolution, and disagreement over demilitarization
under Part II, India also argues that it is not bound by the resolu-
tions of 13 August and 5 January.22 0 This argument is based on the
fact that since the Kashmir dispute was brought to the Security
Council under articles 34 and 35 of the U.N. Charter, the two are
merely recommendations of the Security Council. 21
Since the dispute was brought under articles 34 and 35, the Se-
curity Council only has the power to "make recommendations to the
parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute" under arti-
213. J. KORBEL, supra note 126, at 43.
214. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 64.
215. See Desmond, supra note 47, at 29.
216. U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 2: "All Members [sic], in order to ensure to all of them
the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter." Id.
217. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 31, para. 1: "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." Id.
218. See supra text accompanying note 208.
219. See supra text accompanying note 210.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 212-218.
221. H.S. GURURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 105.
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cles 37 and 38.12 A "recommendation" is not the same as a Security
Council "decision" under article 25, which is binding on U.N. mem-
bers." ' "Recommendations made by the Council under articles 36,
37, 38, and 39, in performance of its function of peaceful settlement,
are, notwithstanding the provision of article 25, to be treated as rec-
ommendations only, and not as legally obligating members to carry
out their terms." 22 4
While a recommendation by itself may not be binding, this is
not the case in the Kashmir dispute. Here, the parties have con-
sented to be bound by the resolutions of 13 August and 5 January.2
A letter dated December 23, 1948, from India's Secretary-General
of the Ministry of External Affairs to the Representative of UNCIP,
stated that the Indian Prime Minister's acceptance of the 5 January
resolution was conditioned on Pakistan's acceptance of the resolu-
tion.228 By this letter, India consented to be bound by the resolution
of 5 January and, through this, the resolution of 13 August as
well. 2 As U.N. members consenting to be bound by the resolutions
to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, India was also bound by its provi-
sional acceptance of the Maharaja's accession and the words of
Jawaharlal Nehru.228 Therefore, India was bound by word and deed
to leave the future of Kashmir to the will of its people.
D. Rebus Sic Stantibus
In 1953, India first claimed a vital change of circumstances
would occur in the Kashmir dispute as a result of the U.S.-Pakistan
222. See supra text and accompanying note 32.
223. U.N. CHARTER art. 37, para. 2: "If the Security Council deems that the continu-
ance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of
settlement as it may consider appropriate." Id.
Art. 38: "Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council
may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a
view to a pacific settlement of the dispute." Id.
224. U.N. CHARTER art. 25: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id.
225. 13 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 360 (1968).
226. See supra text accompanying note 160.
227. Aide Memoire No. 1, Letter Dated 23 December 1948 From the Secretary General
of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of the Government of India
to Mr. Alfredo Lozano, Representative of UNCIP at 23, U.N. Doc. S/1196 (1949):
the Prime Minister emphasized that, if the Government of India were to
accept the plebiscite proposals, no action could be taken in regard to them until
parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August had been fully imple-
mented; (2) that in the event of Pakistan not accepting these proposals or, hav-
ing accepted them, not implementing Parts I and II of the Resolution of 13
August, the Government of India's acceptance of them should not be regarded
as in any way binding upon them .
Id.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
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military aid program due to Pakistan's membership in SEATO. 2 9
The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus applies when an unforeseen
change of circumstances occurs in regard to essential circumstances
existing at the time an agreement was concluded.2 30 The existence of
such circumstances must have been necessary to the parties for their
consent to be bound by the treaty.281
It is argued that Part I, Section B of the resolution of 13 Au-
gust, totally prohibited India and Pakistan from taking any measures
that would have the effect of increasing the striking capacity of the
forces on either side of the cease-fire line. "2 In view of this, it is
argued that the U.S.-Pakistan military aid program constituted a
fundamental change in circumstances. " However, as previously
mentioned, during the period from 1947 to 1965 both countries allot-
ted 30 to 60 % of their budgets to defense. In fact, during this pe-
riod, though the budget percentage spent on defense tended to be
higher in Pakistan, India, with its greater national income, spent
much more money on defense than Pakistan." In addition, while
not actually receiving arms, India did receive large amounts of eco-
nomic aid from the United States, allowing it to devote more of its
own resources to defense. 5
Thus, at the time the resolution of 5 January was accepted and
long afterwards, it was the practice of both countries to devote a
large portion of their budgets to defense. In view of this fact, it can-
not be considered that Part I, Section B of the 13 August resolution
was intended by either party to apply to any augmentation of their
armed forces. Nor can it be considered that the continued existence
of such circumstances had been necessary to the parties for their
consent to be bound by the resolution. Rather, this would seem to
indicate that the section was meant to apply only to the forces in
Kashmir. Therefore, India's claim of rebus sic stantibus in 1953 was
without merit.
As previously mentioned, India had a duty to exercise good
faith in fulfilling its obligations under the resolutions of 13 August
229. See supra text and accompanying note 216.
230. See supra text and accompanying notes 75-86.
231. See supra text accompanying note 203.
232. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 62, para. 1:
A fundamental of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by
the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing
from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis
of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty.
Id.
233. Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 204.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 203.
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and 5 January. 6 By its continuous bad faith assertions of Pakistani
violations of the resolution of 13 August, India breached this duty.2"7
In this way, India avoided the plebiscite obligations of the resolu-
tions and invoked the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. However, a
party whose breach causes a fundamental change of circumstances
may not invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.38 India's breach
of its duty of good faith allowed forty years to pass without holding a
plebiscite in Kashmir.3 9
Regardless of bad faith, forty years after agreeing to the terms
of the 5 January resolution, India's claim of rebus sic stantibus,
reasserted repeatedly, by Indian writers, is now valid.240 The Kashmir
dispute was drawn into the shadow of the Cold War in 1955, when,
in response to Pakistan's membership in SEATO and the Central
Treaty Organization (CENTO), India cultivated relations with the
Soviet Union.241 Thereafter, India began to receive moral support as
well as military aid from U.S.S.R.242
In 1965, the head of UNMOGIP reported that infiltrators had
crossed into Kashmir from the Pakistan side, violating the cease-fire
line.243 This trickle of infiltrators soon escalated to open fighting be-
tween India and Pakistan. 44 By September 1, Pakistani regular
unites were supporting Azad troops in a major attack to cut Indian
lines of communications along the road from Pathankot through
Jammu to Srinagar by way of the Banihal Pass. 4 5 On September 6,
236. A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 87.
237. Id. at 86-87.
It was U.S. aid which enabled India during this period to concentrate on
industrialization at the expense of agriculture: her leaders knew that, in the last
resort, they could rely on American help to feed the people. The result of this
policy [was] . . .the development of a crisis in Indian agriculture of the gravest
kind; but, at the same time, Indian industry [was] able to produce an ever-in-
creasing proportion of sophisticated weapons ....
Id.
238. See supra text and accompanying note 216.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 201-16.
240. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 62, para. 2:
A fundamental change in circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party
invoking it either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other inter-
national obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
Id.
241. Alam, supra note 1, at 70. To this day, a plebiscite on the future of .Kashmir still
has not occurred. Id.
242. H.O. AGARWAL, supra note 92, at 44; H.S. GtJRURAJ RAo, supra note 2, at 104.
243. See generally A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 88 (outlining the relations the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. had with Pakistan and India, respectively, and how this, in turn, affected the Kash-
mir dispute).
244. Id. "The question of Kashmir as one of the constituent States of the Republic of
India has already been decided by the people of Kashmir . . . .Facts show that the popula-
tion of Kashmir do not wish that Kashmir become a toy in the hands of imperialist forces."
(quoting Speech by Nikita Khrushchev in New Delhi, (November 1955)). Id.
245. Alam, supra note 1, at 80.
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India countered this move with an attack across India-Pakistan in-
ternational border, directly into Pakistan from Indian territory.
24 6
The conflict continued, but the Security Council failed to take
any action under Chapter VII of the Charter: Pursuant to article 40,
the Security Council could order the two governments to desist from
further military action, calling on them to issue cease-fire orders to
their forces.24 Failure to comply with this order would demonstrate
an existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of article
39.248 Then, under articles 41 and 42, a variety of actions from eco-
nomic boycotts to military action could be taken to force compliance
with the Security Council decision. 49
Instead, the Security Council continued to make recommenda-
tions under Chapter VI with the same results: After enacting two
unheeded resolutions, the Security Council enacted resolution 211 of
20 August 1965.250 This resolution "demand[ed] that a cease-fire
should take effect" at a specified date. 51 Both governments were
called upon to issue orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a
subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions
held by them before 5 August 1965.252 The parties accepted resolu-
tion 211, but the cease-fire failed to materialize. 5
a
After two more unheeded resolutions, the Tashkent Declaration
246. See A. LAMB, supra note 3, at 120-22.
247. Id. at 122.
248. Id.
249. Alam, supra note 1, at 81; U.N. CHARTER art. 40:
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendation or deciding upon the measures pro-
vided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable . . . .The Security
Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional
measures.
Id.
250. U.N. CHARTER art. 39: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security." Id.
251. U.N. CHARTER art. 41:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call
upon the Members [sic] of the United Nations to apply such measures. These
may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail,
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the
severance of diplomatic relations.
Id.
Art. 42: "Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security .
Id.
252. Alam, supra note 1, at 82 (citing S.C. Res. 211, 21 U.N. SCOR, Supp. (Res. &
Dec.) at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/21/REV.2 (1965) [hereinafter Resolution 211]).
253. See Resolution 211, supra note 252, at 14.
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(the Declaration) secured a cease-fire and ended the stalemate."
The Declaration was the result of the Soviet Union's offer to help
resolve the differences between India and Pakistan. " ' It established
the withdrawal of the armies behind the established international
borders and the 1949 Kashmir cease-fire line and bound the parties
to settle their disputes by peaceful means .25  The Declaration had
little to say directly about the Kashmir dispute other than to note its
existence. 7
The cease-fire line was violated again in 1971 during the war
over Bangladesh when both sides made gains across the 1949 line. 58
In 1984, the Indian army captured nearly 1,000 square miles of ter-
ritory claimed by Pakistan in the northern regions in the area of the
Saltoro Range where vague terms are used to delineate the cease-fire
line under the Karachi Agreement.25 9 Today, sporadic fighting con-
tinues in this region for possession of the Siachen Glacier in the
Saltoro Range.2"  Neither side is willing to escalate the conflict any
further, nor willing to give up the territory it has gained.261
In addition to these developments, there is also the consideration
that over the course of forty years, both countries have integrated
the regions of Kashmir under their control into their societies and
economies. "2 In view of these facts, it is not difficult to see that a
fundamental change of circumstances has occurred. The events that
occurred since the acceptance of the resolutions of 13 August and 5
January: the Cold War, multiple large-scale violations of the cease-
fire agreement, integration and the passing of forty years, were not
foreseen by the parties at the time of agreement.2 "  As a result of
these changed circumstances, holding a plebiscite today is an obliga-
tion radically different from when it was contemplated in 1949 .264
254. Id.
255. Alam, supra note 1, at 82.
256. Id. (citing the Tashkent Declaration, January 10, 1966, India-Pakistan, 560
U.N.T.S. 40 [hereinafter Tashkent Declaration]).
257. Alam, supra note 1, at 82.
258. Tashkent Declaration, supra note 256, at 40, paras. I, II.
259. Id. at 40, para. I.
260. J. PRESCOTT, supra note 47, at 61.
261. Desmond, supra note 47, at 26 (citing the Karachi Agreement); "From Dalunang
eastwards the cease-fire line will follow the Point 15495 . ..thence north to the glaciers
[italics added]. ... Karachi Agreement, supra note 46, at 280, Part II(B)(a)(iii)(d).
262. Desmond, supra note 47, at 29. "On those occasions when the antagonists do fight
at close range, the results can be fearsome. In a month-long clash ending last May, soldiers
battled intensely on a mountain and ridges near the Chumic Glacier." Id.
263. See id. at 27. "The conflict escalated slowly as each side deployed more men, estab-
lished more outpost, introduced more artillery and rockets. In September 1987, the action
peaked, but neither side has been willing to take the next steps, which might involve introduc-
ing air power or expanding the conflict to the south." Id.





Recently, tensions between India and Pakistan have increased
once again after kidnappings and mass demonstrations began in
Kashmir in December of 1989.65 Since the outbreak of violence and
Kashmir Governor Jagmohan's responding crackdown in January, at
least 350 civilians and 62 soldiers have been killed. 6 India charges
that Pakistan is inciting a secessionist struggle in Indian-occupied
Kashmir where some thirty rebel groups are fighting Indian rule.1
6 7
While U.S. officials confirm that Pakistanis are providing aid and
sanctuary to Kashmiri insurgents, Pakistan states that its support is
limited to political, diplomatic and moral support. 6
The rebel factions in Kashmir can be divided into two classes:
Islamic fundamentalists advocating union with Pakistan and, a new
element, those supporting an independent Kashmir2 69 While both el-
ements have received support from Pakistan, former Prime Minister
Bhutto may have lost some support from the independent-Kashmir
element by ruling out an independent Kashmir as an option.1
7 0
To add to an already-tense situation, both countries are exper-
iencing outbreaks of violence. In India's Punjab region, violence
stemming from a separatist movement has resulted in over 300
deaths; while in Pakistan, ethnic violence in the Sind province has
left over 300 dead. 1' Pakistan has accused India of stirring up un-
265. See supra text and accompanying note 217.
266. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 81, art. 62., para. 1:
A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to
those existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not fore-
seen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground for terminating the treaty
unless:
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty.
Id.
267. See Kamen, Removal of Indian Troops May Ease Tension with Pakistan, Diplo-
mats Say, Wash. Post, June 1, 1990, at A29, col. 1; MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 44.
268. MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 44.
Inspired by TV footage of Eastern Europe, which was later taken off Kash-
miri screens because it was too provocative, the insurgents were on a roll. But it
was the arrival in January of Governor Jagmohan, whose first police sweep left
some 100 dead, that started pushing a disgruntled populace into the arms of
secessionists.
Id.; Coll, Kashmiri Hatred of Indian Soldiers Fuels Conflict, Wash. Post, May 30, 1990, at
A1S, col. 1 [hereinafter Coll]. "The government confirms that 62 soldiers have died in am-
bushes by separatists militants, but military sources say the number of deaths is higher." Id.
269. MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 42.
270. Id. at 42; Pakistan's position on Kashmir, Christian Sci. Mon., June 7, 1990, Edi-
torial, at 20. In a letter in response to an earlier editorial,- Irfan Husain, of the Pakistani
Embassy in Washington, stated: "Pakistan is openly giving Kashmir freedom fighters its politi-
cal, diplomatic, and moral support, but this is the extent of our 'active backing.'" Id.
271. MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 44; Fieman, Pakistan ousts Bhutto; corruption is
alleged, Boston Globe, Aug. 7, 1990, at 1, col. 1. Prime Minister Bhutto was dismissed by
President Ghulam Ishaq Kahn on August 6, 1990 and replaced by acting Prime Minister
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi until elections could be held in October. Id.
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rest in Pakistan's Sind province to divert Pakistan's attention from
Kashmir. 7 12
As previously mentioned, many fear that current tensions over
Kashmir may plunge India and Pakistan into an unprecedented full-
scale war where both sides possess nuclear forces.27  Although troops
have moved closer to the borders on both sides and shortened mobili-
zation times, there are many indications of a reluctance on both
sides to take that plunge.174 Recently, India pulled back artillery left
in a forward position after a winter exercise and withdrew troops
from the border between Pakistan and the Indian state of Rajas-
than. 5 Pakistan has suggested that the two countries disengage
from warlike postures, tone down their verbal attacks on one another
and undertake mutual reductions of military forces along the
border.27
Moreover, some assert that the war rhetoric is "entirely simu-
lated" and Kashmir has been used by the leaders on both sides to
stabilize their positions.17 7 Another consideration is the cost of such
a conflict. An Indian study estimated that a quick, conventional con-
flict would cost $2.5 billion dollars, while a recent Pakistani study
estimated a cost of $350 million a day. 8 Finally, the United States,
the Soviet Union, China, Japan and some European countries have
called on both countries to exercise restraint and open peace talks."
Although India rejected a suggestion by Pakistan for discussion of
Kashmir, pressure from the world community may yet succeed in
bringing about such talks, or at least emphasize the lack of support
272. Id.
273. See id. at 42; Ethnic Strife Goes On in Pakistani Province, N.Y. Times, May 29,
1990, § A, at 10, col. 1; Attack on Packed Karachi Bus Lifts Ethnic Death Toll to 300, Wash.
Post, June 1, 1990, at A29, col. 5. "The violence [in the Sind province] stems from deep
hatred between native Sindis and the Mohajirs, descendants of Moslems who immigrated to
Pakistan from Hindu India during the 1947 partition of the subcontinent. Sindis accuse the
better-educated Mohajirs of taking the best jobs and most valuable land." Id.
274. Pakistan's Senior Minister says India Behind Events in Sindh [sic], BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts/The Monitoring Report, May 31, 1990, Part 3, at FE/0778/i.
"Begum Nusrat Bhutto said at a news conference in Rawalpindi on 29th May that Indian
agents were behind the recent unrest in Hyderabad and Karachi in order to avert Pakistan's
attention from Kashmir, Radio Pakistan reported." Id.
275. See supra text and accompanying note 49.
276. See MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 43.
277. Id.; Crossette, India Rejects Talks With Pakistan Over Kashmir, N.Y. Times,
June 9, 1990, § 1, at 3, col. 1. [hereinafter Crossette].
278. 40 Reported Killed in Indian-Pakistani Clash, Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1990, §
1, at 4, col. 2.
279. MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 44.
Kashmir has become a lifesaving political crusade for the embattled Bhutto,
caught between an unforgiving opposition and a still-dominant Army and con-
fronting a civil war in her own home province of Sind . . . . Singh, who also
heads an insecure coalition, has a similar need to pander to militant Hindus who
want to punish both Moslem Kashmiris and Pakistan.
[Vol. 9:1
THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
for either side should war break OUt.2 8 0
VII. Alternatives
On January 1, 1949, the Karachi Agreement's cease-fire order
made a de facto partition of Kashmir. Even today this cease-fire or-
der, aside from minor adjustments in 1965 and 1971, is binding on
both India and Kashmir. In view of the slim chance of a plebiscite or
an evacuation of the territory of Kashmir by Pakistan, one alterna-
tive that remains, in the interest of a final settlement of the dispute,
is to make the de facto partition de jure. In this case, establishing an
international boundary along the cease-fire line would be most easily
accomplished by submitting the disputed boundary for settlement to
a chamber of the International Court of Justice for a decision ex
aequo et bono.28'
In the interest of possessing an undisputed, undisrupted claim to
part of the territory, India and Pakistan would have to drop their
claims to the entire state. Creating an international boundary along
the cease-fire line would require close cooperation between the two
countries. The parties must also be willing to compromise on minor
adjustments to the boundary that will undoubtedly arise. At present,
territory in the northern reaches is in dispute as a result of vagueness
in the 1949 cease-fire agreement. 262 Meetings between former Prime
Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to settle the ongoing
conflict in this region failed to produce a solution.2"' Considering the
history of the Kashmir dispute, a solution for even this small section
of the cease-fire line is more difficult than it sounds.
In view of this fact, the best chance for final settlement of the
dispute may be to submit the boundary for settlement to a chamber
of the International Court of Justice (Court).2 8' This was done 'suc-
cessfully by Burkina Faso and Mali, two decolonized African territo-
ries, where dispute had arisen over 100 miles of common frontier.2 5
France's delimitation of the border in this case did not take into ac-
count native allegiances which compounded the difficulty in deter-
mining a border that satisfied the tribunal inhabitants of the
280. Id. at 42.
281. Chicago Tribune, supra note 278, § 1, at 4, col. 2.
282. Crossette, supra note 277, § 1, at 3, col. 1. "An Indian spokesman said . . . that
the Pakistani response was 'unfortunately hedged with certain reservations' that were unac-
ceptable here." Id. MacFarquhar, supra note 91, at 44. "[I]f India and Pakistan are foolish
enough to fight, they will be on their own. That is the message that has come lately not just
from Washington and Moscow but from the Chinese and Arabs, as well. As one Indian ob-
server pointed out, 'Not even Qadhafi has encouraged either side.'" Id.
283. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 500 (5th ed. 1979). Ex. aequo et bono is a phrase de-
rived from the civil law, meaning, in justice and fairness; according to what is just and good;
according to equity and conscience. Id.
284. Desmond, supra note 47, at 26-27.
285. Id.
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286region.
By agreement between the parties as to the contents of the dis-
pute they are bringing before the Court, they may limit the Court's
jurisdiction and the scope of the judgment. 87 In this way, India and
Pakistan can confine the Court to settlement of the dispute in the
northern regions or for the whole cease-fire line, preventing a judg-
ment on the status of all of Kashmir. The chamber's decision, like
the Court's, is binding and would finally create an international bor-
der, eliminating a continuing thorn in relations between India and
Pakistan. 88
By resorting to the International Court of Justice, India and Pa-
kistan can eliminate much of the disagreement and stalemate that
would undoubtedly occur in settling the border through diplomatic
channels. By placing the final decision in the Court's hands, the
Prime Ministers could escape some of the blame and political risk
that is bound to come with any decision on the future of Kashmir
that does not provide complete possession.
In submitting the dispute to a special chamber of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, it should be agreed between the parties that,
'in addition to applying international conventions, custom and general
principles of law, the Court should be allowed to decide the case ex
aequo et bono.289 This is necessary because it is crucial for the Court
to consider the circumstances surrounding the Kashmir dispute. A
purely legal decision in this case would neglect the roots of the con-
flict and the role that other factors and events played in the dispute.
These elements must be considered in any final settlement of the
border that seeks a fair and equitable solution that both parties can
live with. In view of the violent history of the Kashmir dispute, a
settlement that neglects these elements will not be a final one.
Once India and Pakistan progressed to the stage where they
were willing to submit the border issue to the International Court of
Justice, an agreement to allow the Court to decide ex aequo et bono
286. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 26, reprinted in EVERY-
ONE'S UNITED NATIONS, supra note 31, at 402-09 [hereinafter STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE]:
2. The Court may at any time form a chamber for dealing with a particular
case. The number of judges shall be determined by the Court with the approval
of the parties.
3. Cases shall be heard and determined by the chambers provided for in this
Article if the parties so request.
Id.
287. Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of Dec. 22).
288. Case Comment, International Court of Justice-Case Concerning the Frontier
Dispute, (Burkina Faso v. Mali) 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 718 (1986).
289. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 286, at 406, art.
35, para. 1: "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and
conventions in force." Id.
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would not be too far-fetched. To reach this point, India and Pakistan
would have given up their claims to all of Kashmir. This would indi-
cate a willingness to achieve a final settlement acceptable to both
parties. In this context, a fair and equitable decision would be
viewed as the best means to achieve a solution that was actually
final.
This proposed alternative ignores an important element in the
Kashmir dispute: the people of Kashmir. A growing number of
Kashmiri separatists are calling for independence. 90 Although Paki-
stan still demands that the Kashmiris be allowed to determine the
future of Kashmir by a plebiscite, former Prime Minister Bhutto al-
ready ruled out independence as an option.291 Should the indepen-
dence movement take hold and become the will of the people, Paki-
stan will be forced to reexamine its policy on Kashmir and choose
between the lesser of two possible evils: an independent Kashmir or
the status quo. But at the present, it appears that neither India nor
Pakistan considers an independent Kashmir to be a possibility.
Therefore, although a de jure settlement of the border may not settle
the issue for the Kashmiris or even many Indians and Pakistanis who
feel strongly about the dispute, it would resolve the dispute as it ex-
ists between India and Pakistan as states, reducing the chance of a
large-scale conflict between the two in the future.
VIII. Conclusion
While relations between India and Pakistan are better now than
they have been in the past, the likelihood of a large-scale settlement
of the Kashmir dispute is slim. Earlier attempts by Prime Ministers
Gandhi and Bhutto to settle the dispute in the Saltoro range alone
met with failure. An attempt to settle the entire dispute by making
the cease-fire line an international boundary would be a very risky
undertaking. Each prime minister would run the risk of being the
one who "sold out Kashmir."
In addition to its strategic and economic value, thepossession of
Kashmir has come to be associated with the concepts of national
prestige and justice. After forty years, Kashmir remains an obstacle
290. Id. at 404, art. 27: "A judgment given by any of the chambers provided for in
Articles 26 and 29 shall be considered as rendered by the Court." Id.
291. Id. at 406, art. 38:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions;
(b) international custom; (c) general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; (d) judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex
aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.
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in relations between India and Pakistan. At this point in time, the
chance of a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute is very
doubtful.29
Both India and Pakistan will continue to argue their positions
loudly and forcefully. Both sides have convincing arguments as to
why Kashmir is theirs by right. But as this Comment illustrates, it is
impossible to label one party innocent and the other the offender.
Viewing all of the events from partition to the present, neither side is
more "right" than the other. The only just solution in this case is the
one that, in light of the developing independence movement in Kash-
mir, might dismay both India and Pakistan: a U.N. supervised plebi-
scite that includes an independent Kashmir as a possible outcome. 9
James D. Howley
292. Chicago Tribune, supra note 278, § 1, at 4, col. 2. "Although a majority of young
secessionists at one time favored attaching Kashmir to Pakistan, many now call for indepen-
dent nation status." Id.
293. Coil, supra note 268, May 30, 1990, at A15, col. 1; see.supra text accompanying
note 273.
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